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New Labour and Work-Time Regulation:  
A Marxian Analysis of the UK Economy1 
Bruce Philp, Gary Slater and Daniel Wheatley 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of work-time regulation, introduced by the UK’s 
New Labour governments (1997 to 2010). In doing so, we return to Marx’s 
hypotheses regarding the length of the working day. These include the arguments 
that class conflict over the length of the working day is inherently distributional 
in a surplus-value sense and that workers often display a preference for reduced 
hours even with a proportionate reduction in pay. Our quantitative Marxist 
methodology provides a way of assessing the pattern of surplus-value before and 
during the period of office of the New Labour governments and the distributional 
effects of regulation. The impact of such regulations on workers’ preferences are 
examined through an investigation of British Household Panel Survey data. 
Although many have been sceptical concerning the record of the last Labour 
governments, policies such as the Working Time Regulations (1998) and the 
Work-Life Balance Campaign (2000) are found to have been noteworthy 
innovations in the labour market. This is all the more important given recent 
moves by the successor government to weaken work-time regulation. Our results 
suggest the impact of these policy initiatives was broadly favourable, though the 
effect on men and women was different. 
 
1. Introduction 
The election of the New Labour government in 1997 marked an apparent change in 
approach to labour market and employee relations regulation in the UK. One of the 
clearest signals of this was the commitment of the new government to sign-up to the 
European Social Chapter, a move ferociously resisted and vetoed by the Conservative 
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administration during the negotiations leading up to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
Expectations of the incoming Labour government were high, following eighteen years 
of Conservative rule characterised by incremental and continual steps to weaken trade 
unions and to deliver a flexible labour market. At one level, these expectations were 
met: employment legislation formed a central plank of the first New Labour 
government’s legislative programme. Employment protection was extended in 
established areas, such as unfair dismissal legislation and discrimination. Employment 
legislation was also expanded in new areas which were often, but not exclusively, 
driven by developments at the European level. Key developments included: the 
National Minimum Wage (1998); the Working Time Regulations (1998); family leave 
policies; part-time and fixed-term worker regulations; and, a right to union 
recognition (see Department of Trade and Industry, 1998; Smith and Morton, 2006). 
 
The National Minimum Wage (1998) and the Working Time Regulations (1998) 
stand-out as early, and apparently decisive, changes in approach. These changes were 
heralded by the Labour government as important new interventions which would 
improve the conditions of underpaid and overworked employees, whilst forcing 
employers to operate more efficiently. However, as discussed below, the extent to 
which these changes marked a decisive change or a missed opportunity is a moot 
point in the literature. What has become clear, though, is that the Conservative-Liberal 
Coalition government, elected in May 2010, is focused on weakening labour market 
regulation, arguing that it is detrimental to the flexibility of the UK labour market. 
 
This paper focuses on the Working Time Regulations and the Work-Life Balance 
Campaign, together with their impact. The paper evaluates the effect of changing 
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work-time on the distribution of income in the UK economy, covering the period of, 
and immediately preceding, the election of the New Labour government. To assess 
this distributional issue our work returns to Marx’s hypotheses regarding the length of 
the working day. Among other claims, Marx argued that: (i) class conflict over the 
length of the working day was inherently distributional (in a surplus-value sense); 
and, (ii) workers often exhibited a preference for reduced hours, even if this meant a 
proportionate reduction in the weekly wage (Marx 1976, pp.395-7; 1981, pp.391-2). 
  
In this way, we are able to investigate the impact from regulation on capital and 
labour and better assess the real impact of these legislative changes (in a way which is 
analogous to Marx’s examination of nineteenth century factory acts). Perhaps, too, 
this will allow us to understand better why business is seeking to reverse some of 
these legislative innovations. In Section 2 we discuss the background to the Working 
Time Regulations and the debate regarding their incorporation into UK law. Section 3 
then turns to consider how the impact of regulations on the distribution of income 
might be assessed. To this end, it outlines a theoretical model of surplus-value, 
deriving estimates of surplus and necessary labour. In Section 4 we focus on the 
patterns of work-time and how they impact as an element in the distribution of 
income. We expand on this empirically by estimating the rate of surplus-value, 
exploring it in relation to a hypothetical (ceteris paribus) rate, driven by changes in 
working hours alone. In the penultimate section we examine preferences for hours 
using panel data derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Marx 
suggested workers often preferred reduced hours rather than more pay, and this was a 
second hypothesis he had concerning the conflict over working hours. These same 
data are used to provide a more nuanced measure of surplus-value and variable 
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capital. In concluding, we highlight the importance of the framework proposed and 
approach adopted, evaluating government policies on these issues in this light. 
 
2. The regulation of work-time in the UK 
The Working Time Regulations (WTR) of 1998 (Working Time Regulations, SI 
1998/1833), with subsequent amendments in 2002 and 2007, incorporated key aspects 
of the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) into UK law (Directive 
93/104/EC). Their introduction marked a significant regulatory change in the UK 
labour market. Prior to this, working hours were subject to agreement through 
collective bargaining or, given the declining sphere of trade union influence, 
individual agreement. The EU Directive sought to protect against the possible 
negative effects which long working hours can have on the health of individuals 
(European Commission, 2005). Prior to this, limits on working time had been resisted 
by the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations, committed as they were to 
flexible labour markets as a key plank in their pro-capitalist supply-side economic 
policies. Indeed, the Major government went so far as to challenge the legal basis for 
Working Time Directive as a health and safety measure at the European Court of 
Justice, since this meant that its passage was subject to majority voting rather than 
unanimity in the European Council (Gray, 1997),. The main characteristics of the 
WTR (BERR 2008a) were: (i) a limit of 48 hours a week which the worker can be 
required to work, averaged over a 17 week period; (ii) a maximum average of 8 hours 
work in 24 for night workers; (iii) free health assessments for night workers; (iv) an 
entitlement to 11 hours rest each day; (v) an entitlement to a day off each week; (vi) 
an entitlement to an in-work rest break if the working day is longer than six hours; 
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(vii) an entitlement to four weeks of paid leave per year (pro rata for part-time 
employees); and, (viii) additional entitlements for adolescent workers (BERR, 2008a).  
 
In support of this framework the 1997-2001 Labour government also launched the 
Work-Life Balance Campaign (WLBC), in March 2000. This followed-on from and 
extended an earlier linking of work-time regulation, family policy (including 
extensions to maternity and parental leave entitlements) and the National Childcare 
Strategy in the Fairness at Work white paper  which set-out the recently-elected New 
Labour government’s priorities for industrial relations and  employment  regulation 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1998, chapter 5). The WLBC widened the focus 
of the white paper in seeking to encourage employers to provide a better fit between 
work and private life for all employees, regardless of their domestic responsibilities. 
Through the provision of advice, case-study research, partnerships with twenty-two 
leading employers and modest financial support to help employers access consultancy 
services to help develop new policies and practices, the campaign exhorted employers 
to introduce flexible working for their employees (Arrowsmith, 2001; see Shorthose 
2004 for a critical analysis). Whilst much was made of the intrinsic benefits for 
employees, ministers also placed the benefits to business from adopting more flexible 
practices centre-stage as part of the government’s strategy of raising workplace 
performance and productivity. For example, Education and Employment Secretary 
David Blunkett launched the campaign by stating ‘we want more employers to 
develop working practices that will reward their business and their employees. 
Working together, we can fulfil our vision of enhancing our economic performance 
and at the same time improve the work-life balance for individuals. This is about 
imagination, not legislation’, an emphasis echoed by Minister for Employment and 
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Equal Opportunities Margaret Hodge: ‘Government working together with employers 
for work-life balance will make a real difference; more flexible, competitive and 
profitable businesses - and a better quality of life for those who work in them” 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2000).  
Despite the WLBC campaign’s voluntarist approach, the New Labour government did 
return to the legislative framework to support and promote work-life balance. 
Significant in this regard was the introduction of a statutory right from April 2003 - 
implemented by a series of Flexible Working Regulations - , for parents or guardians 
of children under six, or a disabled child under eighteen, to make a request for flexible 
working. From 2007, the right to request flexible working was widened to include 
those with caring responsibilities for an adult in the home.2  
 
At one level these changes marked a significant and fundamental shift in labour 
market regulation. However, left-focussed economic research has been largely critical 
of many aspects of New Labour policy. In terms of the over-arching economic 
framework, Kitson and Wilkinson (2007) have argued that New Labour embraced the 
supply-side framework which had been a hallmark of Thatcherism, albeit it ‘with 
some nuances and shifts of emphasis’ (p.807). At a more microeconomic level Brown 
et al. (2007) have evaluated the evolving pattern of job quality following the shift in 
labour market and workplace policies. They find that the period 1998-2004 was 
characterised by some improvement in job quality. However, they conclude that it is 
unclear the extent to which this can to be attributed to New Labour policies, rather 
than a favourable macroeconomic climate and rising employment rates. Indeed, they 
argue that one barrier which impeded improved job quality was the pro-business 
stance of New Labour’s employment policy.  
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Although the New Labour policy on work-time regulation may seem to have been a 
departure from the neo-liberalism of the Thatcher and Major governments, many 
commentators have been sceptical of this claim. Smith and Morton (2001, 2006) have 
consistently argued that New Labour continued the neoliberal approach of their 
Conservative predecessors. To be sure, a range of regulations of both domestic and 
European origin were implemented. But too often, they argue, this was done in a 
‘minimalist manner’ (2001, p.122). Compounding this it is argued that scant 
knowledge of workers’ rights, coupled with weak sanctions to enforce the regulations, 
served to further undermine the effectiveness of these policies. It has been argued that 
UK work-time regulation is characterised by an absence of state intervention 
combined with uneven regulation across sectors (Fagan, 2003, p.11). 
 
Indeed, there has been continued evidence of long hours among some employees in 
the UK. For example, Messenger (2011, p.302) reported ‘excessive hours’ (i.e. hours 
over 48 hours per week) among 17.7% of employees in the period 1995-2006. 
Meanwhile evidence reflecting on full-time workers in the UK, both in aggregate 
when compared to other EU nations (see Philp and Wheatley, 2013) and among 
specific groups of workers such as managers and professionals, (see Philp and 
Wheatley, 2011) is also indicative of continued long hours. The low coverage of 
collective bargaining agreements and the presence of long hours cultures in the UK 
act as significant drivers in the over-work of employees, reflected in a reported 6.1 
hours gap between agreed and usual weekly hours (Fagan, 2003, p.11). Despite 
continuing evidence of long hours, the New Labour government resisted pressure to 
end the ability for UK workers to opt-out of working time limits. This followed from 
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the Directive’s built-in 2003 opt-out facility review date. Following several 
Commission proposals, votes in the European Parliament and inconclusive 
discussions at the European Council, ultimately the opt-out review became linked 
with a proposed directive on temporary agency workers (see Keter, 2009). This led to 
a political agreement finally being reached at the June 2008 European Council, in 
which the UK allowed the agency directive to progress – not least in the light of 
pressure from its own backbenchers – in return for retention of the 48 hour limit opt-
out in the UK, albeit with a new upper limit of 60 hours (see Hyman, 2008, p. 16). 
However, subsequent greement could not be reached between the Council and the 
European Parliament and no further revisions to the directive have been made to date, 
with the opt-out remaining in place..	 In other areas of employment regulation, the 
New Labour government avoided legal measures altogether, instead opting for ‘soft 
regulation’ in areas such as industrial relations, where a partnership approach was 
encouraged  through exhortation and encouragement alone (Stuart et al. 2011). 
Against this background, it appears that successive Labour governments suffered from 
an uneasy tension between a continued preference for a supply-side approach to 
economic policy, and the need for labour market regulation to address the worst 
labour market abuses and the requirements of European Union directives. 
 
With respect to the latter, Smith and Morton (2006, p.413) argue that the 
incorporation of the EWTD into UK law is the ‘most vivid’ example of the Labour 
governments’ minimalist approach to transposing European law to the UK. Crucially, 
the EWTD’s provision  for individual employees to be permitted to opt-out of the 
maximum normal working week of 48 hours– included following demands from the 
then Conservative UK government (Geyer et al. 2005, p.126) – was fully utilised by 
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the incoming New Labour government.Although elected with a manifesto 
commitment to introduce work time regulations, in the course of transposing the 
directive into UK law as the Working Time Regulations ‘the Blair government fully 
exploited the derogations, exemptions and general flexibilities provided’ (ibid. p.136-
7).  As Barnard et al. (2003) note, the individual opt-out has been commonly used 
substantially weakening the legislation. This, of course, raises questions about the 
nature of choices individuals make and the circumstances in which they make them. 
In particular, workers may work beyond the WTR limit because of fear (for example 
about job security) or coercion in the workplace (for example from managers).  
 
This pattern can be seen in the way other labour market regulations were structured. 
For example, the provisions of policies seeking to improve work-life balance seem to 
conflict with the avowed progressive intent. For example the Flexible Working 
Regulations, noted above, created the right for employees to request flexible working. 
However, employers were not bound by legislation to agree to the request. Rather, 
employers were permitted to refuse requests if they ‘consider’ that one or more 
grounds, as set-out in the legislation, apply to the request. These include the cost of 
accommodating the employee’s request, the difficulty of finding staff to cover the 
change in working time or the impact of the change on the quality and delivery of the 
service, none of which are simple criteria to assess in objective terms.. In this context 
these developments made no real challenge to employer power, or allowed for state 
coercion if employers reject such requests on the basis of their own narrow interests, 
which may be trivial (for a discussion of such issues in the context of the work-time 
preferences of managers and professionals see Wheatley et al 2011).  
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Thus it appears that, upon inspection, the shift heralded by the raft of legislation and 
regulations introduced by the New Labour governments was not as radical a departure 
as it may have first appeared. That said, it remains to be established what the actual 
effect was, even if the reality of protection fell short of the expectations of some 
commentators and academics. It is certainly the case that these changes would not 
have been introduced by a Conservative government. Indeed, the Conservative-
Liberal Coalition entered office promising to review the Labour legacy, the Coalition 
Agreement stating ‘[w]e will examine the balance of the EU’s existing competences 
and will, in particular, work to limit the application of the Working Time Directive in 
the United Kingdom’ (HM Government, 2010). In particular, the Coalition has 
restated its commitment to retaining the individual opt-out from work-time rules (so 
important in weakening the regulations) and to reversing changes imposed following 
legal challenges (in particular relating to the work-time of those on-call) (BIS, 2011). 
So, from a left-perspective the regulations have always been flawed and insufficient to 
protect workers, while from the political right clearly the implication is that the 
regulations are an unnecessary burden on business.  
 
This, in some sense, becomes an empirical question: what was the impact of work-
time regulation under New Labour, in terms of distribution and the well-being of 
workers, in the private sector? In the next section we shall consider the issue of 
distribution, connecting the conflict to Marx’s theory of surplus-value, located within 
a new interpretation conceptual framework. In the subsequent section we shall then 
empirically estimate the rate of surplus-value before examining how it was affected 
by changes in the length of the working day. This approach is analogous to Marx’s 
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treatment of absolute surplus-value and his investigation of conflict over the length of 
the working day in Chapter 10 of the first volume of Capital. 
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3. Surplus-Value and the Length of the Working Day 
Radical economists have been interested in the determinants and dynamics of work-
time since the nineteenth century. In the first volume of Capital, published in 1867, 
Marx paid attention to the class-based theory of work-time determination (the 
production of absolute surplus-value), investigating it using empirical evidence and 
evaluating it in its (factory act) policy context (Marx 1976, pp.340-416). Moreover, he 
elaborated on this analysis by considering workers’ preferences for hours in relation 
to wages (Marx 1976, pp.395-7; 1981, pp.391-2 ). In combining these two elements of 
Marx’s analysis we intend to offer an insight into New Labour’s policy on work-time. 
 
In the early stages of Britain’s industrial revolution capitalists imposed longer-and-
longer working days on an unwilling labour force, culminating in regulation against 
this in the form of various factory acts passed from 1802 to 1850. And, partly as a 
result of this, emphasis shifted from extensive to intensive labour extraction — i.e. 
from absolute to relative surplus-value production — in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Marx, 1976, Hobsbawm, 1968). Of interest to us in this paper is 
whether New Labour work-time policy has had any impact on the hours people work 
and, relatedly, their satisfaction with hours.  
 
The Marxian notion of surplus-value is central to the analysis of capitalism, and the 
“new interpretation” (Duménil, 1980; Foley 1982; for an exposition of these 
approaches see also Mohun, 1994, 2004) is an approach which maintains the 
macroeconomic equivalence of labour-time and money value added. In this setting the 
rate of surplus-value is defined in terms of the distribution of net output. In this 
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section we shall outline the basics of this theoretical approach before discussing the 
productive-unproductive labour distinction in relation to surplus-value. 
 
In order to effect the translation between the sum of values and the sum of prices the 
new interpretation uses a particular coefficient — the value of money (m) — to 
render clear their interconnection. Surplus-value is the equivalent of profit, interest 
and rent, and variable capital comprises the wages paid to workers by capitalists. The 
value of labour power (VLP) is the money wage rate (w) multiplied by the value of 
money (i.e. ܸܮܲ ൌ ݓ݉). This can be thought of as the cost of satisfying socially 
determined human needs at a particular point in time which must be satisfied for 
workers to provide their capacity to work. 
 
In the empirical analysis, to be outlined below, we will assume that the unit of time 
which dominates production, is the average working week. That is, surplus and 
necessary labour, for an average capitalist subsector worker, reflect a distribution of 
hours (between capital and productive labour) for a representative week, over a year. 
 
In aggregate, the rate of surplus-value ( s ) is the ratio of aggregate surplus-value (S) 
to aggregate variable capital (V). Wage rates, recall, are connected to the VLP via the 
value of money. The complement to variable capital as a share of net output is defined 
as surplus-value. In terms of the value of labour power the ratio of aggregate surplus-
value (given by ܵ ൌ ܮሺ1 െ ܸܮܲሻ , to aggregate variable capital (represented by 
ܸ ൌ ܮ. ܸܮܲሻ, gives us an alternative formula for the rate of surplus-value (where L is 
the total number of hours worked in the economy). 
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Mohun (1994) demonstrates that the rate of surplus-value, under new interpretation 
assumptions, will also equal the ratio of aggregate profit () to aggregate wages (W), 
derived from multiplying physical outputs by prices. In our case aggregate wages will 
be equal to the hourly wage rate (scalar w), multiplied by the direct labour input per 
unit of output per week (row vector l) and the output level per week (column vector x). 
The row vector of prices (p) multiplied by the column vector of net outputs (y) gives 
aggregate net output, and if we deduct aggregate wages from this we derive aggregate 
profits. Thus, the following holds: 
ݏᇱ ൌ ܸܵ ൌ
ܮሺ1 െ ܸܮܲሻ
ܮ. ܸܮܲ ൌ
࢖࢟ െ ݓ࢒࢞
ݓ࢒࢞ ൌ

W																														ሺ1ሻ	
We thus define the rate of surplus-value, and establish the equivalence of this and the 
ratio of aggregate profits and aggregate wages, thereby providing a practical way to 
estimate the surplus-value rate using national income data. This is because, in this 
framework: ‘Net output … is divisible into aggregate wages and aggregate profits; net 
output as an aggregate of labour-times is divisible into aggregate necessary labour and 
aggregate surplus labour, and as a money-value sum into aggregate variable capital 
and aggregate surplus-value’ (Mohun, 1994, p.403) Therefore, in principle, the 
expression  W⁄  gives us an operational way to calculate the surplus-value rate using 
national income data. 
 
One complicating factor concerns the productive-unproductive labour distinction. 
This distinction is applied by many Marxian economists (Moseley, 1985; Foley, 1986; 
Shaikh and Tonak, 1994), whilst others have questioned the use of these Marxian 
categories (Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Laibman, 1992). Advocates of the distinction 
have argued that the vast majority of government employees, plus many groups of 
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private sector workers (those in managerial roles, finance and advertising for 
example), are unproductive. Such workers do not create surplus-value and hence they 
are paid out of revenue (which is a transfer from surplus-value). This has implications 
for the empirical estimation of the surplus-value rate.  
 
In order to examine changes in the rate of surplus-value consequent upon a change in 
the length of the average working week we will focus on an average worker (thus our 
analysis remains at the aggregate level). In the first case (where we treat all private 
sector workers as productive) we will consider the distributive effects emanating from 
the change in the average working hours of those in private sector employment. New 
Labour brought in various measures intended to give workers more control over the 
hours they worked, and we will ascertain the distributive effects of these within a 
surplus-value framework. Thereafter we will consider how distribution is affected by 
changes in working hours if we only consider “productive labour” (to be defined 
below) as value creating. In particular we will consider how changes in the average 
hours worked by productive private sector workers (employees and the self-employed) 
change the surplus-value rate, examining this in an absolute surplus-value production 
framework. In both cases data will be derived from income-based national income 
data (the “Blue Book”) which will be supplemented by variables constructed using the 
full panel of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). By combining the latter 
with the former we are able to better replicate Marxian categories. 
 
4. Two Empirical Approaches to Surplus-Value  
There have been a number of attempts to empirically investigate trends in the rate of 
surplus-value (e.g. Weisskopf, 1979; Moseley, 1988; Gouverneur, 1982, 1990; Shaikh 
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and Tonak 1994). Our approach is distinct because of: (i) the time-frame being 
investigated; (ii) the data being used; (iii) the comparison being made under different 
assumptions about the productive-unproductive labour distinction. 
 
Foley’s (1986) seminal work on the new interpretation  examines value flows in the 
US economy, and we will use this to organise our analysis. Foley estimates the 
aggregate of new value created, explicitly excluding the wages of government 
workers from aggregate value (p.123, lines 5-6).4 In order to replicate this in our 
analysis we estimate the wages of public sector workers, using the full panel of the 
BHPS to estimate the wage share of public sector workers in each sample period 
(1992-2009). This then allows us to deduct public sector wages from aggregate 
compensation, leaving us with private sector wages. In the next subsection we will 
develop this within a framework which treats all private sector labour as productive. 
Thereafter we construct an empirical model adhering to the productive-unproductive 
labour distinction, in keeping with Foley (1986, pp.122-123). 
 
4.1 Surplus-value assuming all private sector labour is productive 
In order to examine the effect of changes in working hours on the rate of surplus-
value we will take a base year of 1992 and define surplus-value as the sum of the 
gross operating surpluses of financial, public limited and private limited companies in 
the UK economy (Office for National Statistics ID numbers NQNV+NRJT+NRJK in 
Table 1). In addition we include a portion of mixed income proxying profits in the 
mixed income category (a spreadsheet of the steps undertaken in the following 
analysis is available from the authors on request). The latter is undertaken to ensure 
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that all of the main income-based GDP categories are incorporated into our model. 
GDP (when measured by category of income) is equal to gross operating surplus plus 
gross mixed income plus compensation of employees. Mixed income is defined as: 
‘The balancing item on the generation of income account for unincorporated 
businesses owned by households. The owner or members of the same household often 
provide unpaid labour inputs to the business. The surplus is therefore a mixture of 
remuneration for such labour and return to the owner as entrepreneur’ (Office for 
National Statistics, 2013). For completeness, we undertake a procedure to apportion 
mixed income between capital and labour, though the relatively small size of the 
mixed income category in GDP data implies there will be little substantive effect of 
doing this.5 We treat all mixed income as private sector employment and estimate the 
number of self-employed workers (as a proportion of total private sector employment) 
using the distribution in the BHPS sample each year as a proxy. We calculate the 
average weekly wage for private sector employees and use this, multiplied by the 
number of self-employed workers, to estimate the aggregate wage component of 
mixed income. We then subtract this from aggregate mixed income to derive the 
aggregate profit component of mixed income. 
 
The rate of surplus-value is then defined (in aggregate) as the ratio of corporate profits 
plus the profit component of self-employed income, divided by the aggregate wage 
component of mixed income plus private sector (employee) wages. In order to 
calculate the latter we use the wage data in the BHPS to estimate the private sector 
employee wage share, and multiply this by aggregate compensation of employees 
(ONS code HAEA) taken from the Blue Book. The trajectory in the rate of surplus 
value (s’) is depicted in Figure 1, and in Figure 2 we outline the percentage point 
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change in the surplus-value rate in each given year. Of particular note in these figures 
are the rises in the surplus-value rate in the early part of the 1990s, and the falls in the 
rate which began in 1996, becoming particularly pronounced in the period which 
coincided with the first term New Labour government, 1997-2001. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
In order to provide insight into the effect of changes in working hours on the rate of 
surplus-value we will use our aggregate profit () and aggregate private sector wages 
(W) data (each of which includes their respective share of mixed income), allocating 
the average working day week for those in private sector employment between 
surplus and necessary labour in proportion to these income streams. Defined thus, 
aggregate profits and private sector wages are given as follows: 
 ൌ ࢖࢟ െ ݓ࢒࢞																																																									ሺ2ሻ 
W ൌ ݓ࢒࢞																																																													ሺ3ሻ  
Where ሶ݄  is the number of hours worked per private sector employee (which is a 
weighted average of the hours worked by employees and those worked by the self-
employed), necessary labour ( ሶ݊  ) for a private sector worker is defined thus:    
ሶ݊ ≝ W ሶ݄൅W																																																												ሺ4ሻ	
And, the level of surplus labour for an average worker is given by: 
ሶ݊ ′ ≝  ሶ݄൅W																																																										ሺ5ሻ	
On the basis of these definitions, and using a method inspired by Gouverneur (1990), 
it is possible to use ሶ݊ 	from a base year and look at the effect of a change in the 
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average working day in subsequent years, isolating this from other drivers of surplus-
value production (for example, relative surplus-value production and changes in the 
real wage). That is, to isolate absolute surplus-value emanating from changes in 
working hours, we will hold ሶ݊  constant and calculate the rate of surplus-value using 
the actual working day less ሶ݊  in the base year, deriving an inferred level of ݊′ሶ  as a 
residual. Note, this is an average inferred from aggregate data, thereby not 
diminishing the macroeconomic nature of the new interpretation framework. 
 
This paper aims to explore the impact of changes in average working hours in terms 
of Marx’s theory of surplus-value, hence we will do so using a ceteris paribus 
approach which takes necessary labour as constant (at 1992 levels). This allows us to 
explore what the rate of surplus-value would be for a given level of necessary labour, 
isolating changes in the rate as a consequence of changes in work-time alone. Thus, 
we derive an alternative rate of surplus-value (ݏ∗), which maps changes in the rate of 
surplus-value as they would be driven by changes in working hours alone. This series 
is represented by the dashed line in Figure 1. 
 
Comparison of ݏ′ and ݏ∗	provide an interesting illustration of the impact of falling 
hours on distribution. In 1998 ݏ∗ peaks at 42.33%, before it begins to fall reaching 
33.44% in 2008. Although there is some rise in the subsequent year it would seem 
there were marked gains for workers if we examine the effect of changes in work-time 
alone. This can be contrasted with the period of Conservative government predating 
the period of our investigation, where lengthening hours were a hallmark of the 
Thatcherite governments. 
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4.2 Surplus-Value Incorporating a Productive-Unproductive Labour Distinction 
Having outlined one conceptualisation of surplus-value, we will now consider a 
second approach which replicates that of Foley (1986, pp.122-123). This approach 
differs in that it is only the wages and labour time of productive workers which are 
considered part of variable capital (the numerator of the rate of surplus-value) and the 
wages of unproductive workers (employees and self-employed) are reallocated to the 
numerator (since they are paid out of revenue, i.e. surplus-value). The method is 
otherwise identical to that outlined in subsection 4.1. 
 
Precisely defining productive and unproductive labour is replete with difficulty, and 
space prohibits us from discussing this at length here (interested readers are directed 
to Shaikh and Tonak 1994 for an extensive investigation, and to Laibman 1992 for a 
critique of such approaches). Workers are categorised in the BHPS according to the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and we use this to classify productive 
and unproductive work in Table 1. Broadly, activities which produce surplus-value 
are deemed productive (e.g. machine operatives in manufacturing) whereas work 
which realises, but does not produce surplus-value, is deemed unproductive (e.g. 
finance and advertising). Difficulties in precisely separating productive and 
unproductive work include the inseparability of organisational and supervisory roles 
in management (Duménil and Lévy, 2011). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In calculating the surplus-value rate in this case we define surplus-value as 
comprising corporate profits, the wages of unproductive private sector workers, and 
mixed income, less the aggregate wage component of productive self-employment. 
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Aggregate variable capital is equal to the wages of productive employees plus the 
aggregate wage component of productive self-employment. The trajectory of this rate 
(s’) is outlined in Figure 3, as is the hypothetical rate (s*) driven by changes in the 
working hours of productive workers alone. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
It is clear that in employing the productive-unproductive labour distinction, the rate of 
surplus-value is higher. In criticising approaches which regard all private sector 
labour as productive Foley argues ‘this way of looking at things gravely 
underestimates both the productivity reached by the capitalist system and the surplus 
value it can achieve’ (1986, p.124). Thus, the rate of surplus-value in our second 
approach fluctuates between 130.35 and 178.34%: figures that are far higher than in 
the case above. Were we to include the wages of public sector workers in the 
numerator of the surplus-value rate this figure would be even higher. 
 
In terms of our hypothetical rate driven by changes in working hours (of productive 
workers) alone, the rate begins to fall from 1998, slowly at first, and then gaining 
momentum in the later years of the New labour government. Thus, by 2009 the 
hypothetical rate (driven by changes in working hours alone) stands at 105.09% 
whereas the actual rate is 164.87%. 
 
In summary, it is clear from comparison of s' and s’* (in both models) that most of the 
fluctuations in the actual surplus-value rate are a consequence of factors other than 
changes in the length of the working day (e.g. relative surplus-value production and 
changes in the real wage). However, insofar as there is a secular trend it is apparent 
that s’* had generally risen in the latter years of the Conservative government, and 
22 
 
that changes in working hours in the periods of New Labour government generated a 
period of falling working hours with an associated effect on the rate of surplus-value. 
Whatever the disappointment associated with the scope of New Labour’s labour 
market reforms, such patterns are significant, especially when set against the threat to 
work-time regulation posed by the present administration. 
 
It is therefore apparent that falling working hours were a significant feature of the 
New Labour governments. However, what is not clear is whether policy changes 
increased the satisfaction of workers vis-à-vis work-time. 
 
5. Preferences for Reduced Hours: Private Sector Employees 
In the Marxian analysis of working hours it is important to recognise that there are 
distributional effects stemming from changes in the average length of the working day. 
Furthermore, issues related to workers’ preferences for hours are important. 
Dissatisfaction with hours is one facet of the alienation felt by workers under 
conditions of capitalist production. One feature of mainstream analyses is that there is 
a strong presumption that observed outcomes (working hours) accord with utility 
maximising behaviour, subject to constraints. In this context the hours individuals 
work then reflect these preferences, and we would expect broad satisfaction with 
hours worked once budget constraints are incorporated. Empirical evidence shows 
that this presumption is seriously flawed (e.g. Wheatley et al. 2011).2 
 
One of the features of various UK Government surveys is that they explicitly ask 
workers if they are satisfied with the hours they work, and of more significance they 
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ask workers if they would wish to work shorter hours, even if it means a 
commensurate reduction in pay. In the previous section we considered the impact of 
work-time regulation on the distribution of income, in terms of a Marxian surplus-
value rate. We demonstrated that there were falls in surplus-value emanating from 
changes in work-time alone (ݏ∗), and this coincided especially with the transition from 
Conservative to New Labour governments. 
 
One important related issue is whether the period associated with transition to New 
Labour heralded an improvement in people’s satisfaction with hours (i.e. did this 
diminish alienation within the labour process?). In order to investigate this we will use 
panel data extracted from the British Household Panel Survey from 1993-2009 (note 
that 1992 is not included in the analysis as a series of variables were not collected in 
this initial year of the BHPS). Analysis comprises separate multinomial logit 
regression models for men and women, as it has been shown that there continues to be 
significant gender differences with respect to work-time (and preferences). On 
aggregate, men continue to work lengthier hours than women, with this being 
particularly pronounced in the UK (see Bielinski et al. 2002; Fagan, 2003, p.32). This 
may, in part, be a result of men feeling financial compunction (in some cases linked to 
low pay in their sector of employment). Meanwhile, women continue to be burdened 
with the majority of household responsibilities including the provision of childcare, 
driving greater incidence of flexible and reduced hours work and preferences for 
shorter work-time (McDowell et al. 2005; Fagan, 2003, p.41). Multinomial logit 
regression is suitable due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable which 
measures respondents preferences regarding their hours of work, where ‘carry on 
working the same number of hours’ = 0, ‘work more hours than you do now’ = 1, and 
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‘work shorter hours than you do now’ = 2. This dependent variable reflects answers to 
the following question in the BHPS: ‘Thinking about the hours you work, assuming 
that you would be paid the same amount per hour, would you prefer to work fewer 
hours than you do now?’ The models consider preferences regarding working hours, 
as the analysis presented seeks to understand, using macroeconomic independent 
variables and a range of control variables, the effects of New Labour employment 
policies on the alignment between workers’ preferences and outcomes. Preference for 
shorter working hours is therefore used as a proxy for dissatisfaction with work-time.  
 
The dependent variable is regressed against macroeconomic characteristics, 
measuring the effects of the unemployment rate, Working Time Regulations, Work-
Life Balance Campaign and the presence of a Labour government. Aspects of time-
use are included as control variables as work-time and the household division of 
labour (reflected in hours of housework and care) have been found in previous 
research to have statistically significant impacts on preferences for shorter hours (see 
Philp and Wheatley, 2011; MacDonald et al, 2005). Research within both mainstream 
and heterodox economics has identified a range of individual and household 
determinants of satisfaction levels, which are thus incorporated into the analysis as 
control variables, including age (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), education (Dolan 
et al, 2008), income (Easterlin, 2001; Clark et al, 2008), occupation (Wheatley et al, 
2011), and the presence of dependent children (Garcia et al, 2007; Fagan, 2003, p.41). 
The results of our panel data analyses are reported in Table 2. The output includes 
marginal effects at mean (MEM) which allows interpretation of the magnitude of the 
impact of variations in the control variables on the likelihood to report preferences for 
reductions in hours.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The results suggest, in terms of individual variables, that age is positively related to 
preferences for reduced hours among private sector employees, i.e. the older you are 
the more likely you are to desire reduced hours with a commensurate reduction in pay, 
although the coefficient on the quadratic term suggests this is only the case up to a 
certain age after which preferences for shorter hours begin to decrease once more. The 
same pattern is present among those reporting preferences for more hours, although 
the size of the effect is smaller. A second factor is the length of workers’ commutes: 
the longer the commute the greater the likelihood of a preference for reduced hours 
(the same relationship is not present among those who desire more hours). Care givers 
are also more likely to state a desire for reduced hours, particularly amongst female 
employees. As we might expect hours worked are positively related to the preference 
for reduced hours among men and women evidencing the negative effects of lengthy 
work-time. Meanwhile, the opposite is found among those stating preferences for 
more hours reflecting the underemployment present among some workers. Annual 
income, too, exhibits a positive coefficient among those who desire shorter hours and 
a negative coefficient among those desiring more hours. This indicates that those on 
low pay are less willing to accept reduced hours, and we suspect this is because of the 
impact on tight household incomes for those in such circumstances. Concerning 
children, there is a difference between the regression results for men and women. Men 
with children are less likely to desire a reduction in hours than men without children, 
whereas consistent with other research (e.g. Fagan, 2003, p.40-1), women are more 
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likely to express a desire for reductions in hours when children are present. If we 
accept this correlation it is perhaps indicative of the fact that childcare responsibilities 
tend to fall disproportionately on women, resulting in them working a “double shift” 
of paid work and child care, while men’s desire for fewer hours diminishes as they are 
subject to feelings of financial compunction. 
 
With respect to education, there seems to be no correlation between educational 
attainment and preferences for reduced hours, except for women with intermediate-
level ‘A’ level and GCSE qualifications who exhibit a significantly greater preference 
for reduced hours with less pay relative to those without qualifications. Those with ‘A’ 
level qualifications also, interestingly, report a lesser desire for more hours than those 
with no qualifications. This may reflect preferable working conditions (with respect to 
hours) among more qualified workers. Turning to differences by occupation group, 
the desire for reduced hours is particularly pronounced among managers, 
professionals, and associate professional and technical occupations of both sexes in 
comparison to those in elementary occupations, likely reflecting the impact of 
extensive hours worked in some of these occupations. Differences also emerge in 
administrative, sales and customer service and machine operative roles, although the 
size of the effects and level of statistical significance are less consistent among these 
occupation groups. 
 
Of particular interest in our study are the macroeconomic variables. As we might 
expect the annual national unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the 
preference for reduced hours among both men and women: workers tend to be less 
dissatisfied with their working hours when there is a larger “reserve army” of the 
27 
 
unemployed. Of special relevance for the present study is the coefficient associated 
with the dummy variable pertaining to the introduction of the Working Time 
Regulations (1998). We find that that it is significant (at the 5% level) for men, with a 
negative coefficient. In other words, preferences for reduced hours seem to have 
fallen since the introduction of legislation giving workers the right to various breaks 
and to refuse long hours by the New Labour government. Overall, the regulations 
have facilitated a greater alignment between male workers’ preferences and outcomes 
by giving workers greater control over the excesses associated with particularly long 
hours. By contrast, for women, this policy initiative was not significant, reflecting a 
lower incidence of long-hours working (see Mutari and Figart, 2000, p.244). Instead, 
Table 2 indicates that the WLBC impacted more on women’s preferences for reduced 
hours, with a significant (at the 1% level) fall in the desire for shorter hours with less 
pay following the introduction of this policy initiative. This suggests that flexibility 
was the key dimension for women workers, rather than absolute hours.  
 
Finally, a dummy was introduced for the period associated with the New Labour 
government. For both men and women there was a negative coefficient indicating 
preferences for reduced hours with less pay was lower under New Labour. However, 
this was not significant at the 10% level for men whereas for women it was significant 
at the 5% level. This, again, suggests that other aspects of Labour policy impacted on 
women’s satisfaction with hours (e.g. family tax credits). In addition, it is worth 
noting that the presence of the New Labour Government is also associated with an 
increase in the preferences for more hours among women, perhaps indicative of the 
effects of employment and welfare policies which encouraged employment among 
mothers (McDowell et al, 2005, 446). 
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The results of this analysis lend further weight to the suggestion that New Labour 
policy on work-time had a significant effect on workers, both in terms of its ceteris 
paribus impact on distribution (measured by the rate of surplus-value), and because of 
its impact on satisfaction with hours. After a period of Conservative administration, 
which had been hostile to any intervention in the labour market, the first term New 
Labour government introduced policies which improved the conditions of workers in 
this regard. This result is clear in the data: workers were happier, in this regard, when 
these policy initiatives were introduced. For women, this had a significant effect on 
their satisfaction with hours when they were able to work more flexibly (as a 
consequence of the WLBC). For men, who tend to work in more traditional formats, it 
was the WTR that impacted their satisfaction favourably.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Marx’s analysis of conflict over the length of the working day has been generally 
relegated to a secondary concern behind issues such as the transformation problem 
and the falling rate of profits hypothesis. It is our view that Marx’s analysis of ‘The 
Working Day’, in the first volume of Capital, provides a valuable insight into 
distribution, legislation and alienation. While it may be necessary to re-situate Marx’s 
analysis in a more modern conceptual and empirical approach, the influence of Marx 
in our analysis of the effect of New Labour work-time policies in the period 1997-
2010 is clear. We also contend that the results we have obtained are significant, and 
are an important caveat when assessing the performance of the governments. Our 
results suggest that, while the outcome was less desirable than might have been hoped 
29 
 
for, there were nevertheless positive effects, in terms of distribution and satisfaction 
with work-time, emanating from these initiatives. 
 
This paper has used publically-available data to examine the rate of surplus-value and 
assess the impact of changing working hours on it in the period 1992-2009. The 
results are clear and interesting: 
1. The initial years associated with New Labour coincided with a period when there 
were profound gains for workers in the form of diminished surplus-value rates 
(see Figure 1), calculated on the basis of gross incomes. 
2. From 1996-1999 there were modest falls in the average duration of work-time for 
UK workers. Ceteris paribus this had a negative effect on the rate of surplus-value 
demonstrated by the fall in ݏ∗ over this period. 
3. Individual characteristics — e.g. age, commuting times, hours worked, children — 
have a significant effect on preferences for reduced hours (with commensurate 
reductions in pay). The size of the “reserve army of the unemployed” also impacts 
on preferences for reduced hours, with the degree of dissatisfaction diminishing 
when unemployment is high. 
4. Policy initiatives associated with New Labour were also correlated with workers’ 
preferences for reduced hours with less pay, indicating greater satisfaction. The 
WTR diminished preferences for reduced hours among men, indicating a better 
alignment between hours and preferences. The WLBC also had an equivalent 
effect upon women. 
 
Progressive economists have many reasons to be disappointed with the performance 
of the three New Labour governments in the period 1997-2010. However, our results 
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suggest New Labour work-time policies, ceteris paribus, had a negative effect on the 
rate of surplus-value, suggesting the exploitation of labour over this period diminished. 
At the same time pro-worker work-time regulation and policy initiatives contributed 
to a greater alignment of hours worked, with preferred hours. Under the subsequent 
Coalition government there is likely to be a return by employers to greater reliance on 
absolute surplus value production through weakening of work-time regulation. 
Whatever the failings of other aspects of New Labour policy, these initiatives should 
be welcomed by those with a commitment to workers’ well-being, especially when set 
against government policy in the period before and after.  
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Appendix 1: ONS Statistical Sources 
Definition ONS Code Source 
Gross operating surplus: financial 
corporations (NSA) 
NQNV ONS Website 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/
default.asp 
Accessed 24th October, 2013 
 
 
Gross operating surplus: NFCos: private 
(NSA). 
NRJK 
Gross operating surplus: NFCos: public: 
(NSA). 
NRJT 
Total compensation of employees (NSA). HAEA 
 
Mixed income, gross (NSA). QWLT 
 
Private Sector Employment (NSA): 
Headcount: Thousands 
 
CDID 
 
  
38 
 
Figure 1: Surplus Value Rates (%) with all Private Sector Labour Productive  
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in the UK Surplus-Value Rate, 1992-2009 
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Figure 3: Surplus Value Rates (%) with Productive-Unproductive Labour  
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Table 1: SOC Categories of Productive and Unproductive Labour 
Productive Labour SOC Unproductive Labour SOC 
  Managers and Senior Officials 1 
Professional Occupations 
 
2 
 
Exceptions 
Legal Professionals 
Business and Statistical 
Professionals 
 
 
 
241 
242 
Associate Professional and 
Technical Occupations 
3 Exceptions 
Protective Service Occupations 
Legal Associate Professionals 
Business and Finance Associate 
Professionals 
Sales and Related Associate 
Professionals 
 
331 
352 
353 
 
354 
Administrative and Secretarial 
Occupations 
4 Exception 
Administrative Occupations: 
Finance 
 
412 
Skilled Trades Occupations 5   
Personal Service Occupations 6   
  Sales and Customer Service 
Occupations 
7 
Process, Plant and Machine 
Operatives 
8   
Elementary Occupations 9   
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Table 2: Preferences regarding working hours (private sector) 
  Men Women 
  
Coefficient S.E. Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficient S.E. Marginal 
Effects 
0 (Base outcome = prefer same hours) 
1 Prefer more hours       
 Constant -0.915** 0.364 — -1.867***   0.373   — 
 Microeconomic Variables       
 Age 0.039*** 0.013   0.000 0.095***   0.014   0.004*** 
 Age2/100 -0.084*** 0.017   -0.002*** -0.152***   0.018   -0.007*** 
 Working hours -0.030*** 0.002  -0.002*** -0.042***   0.003   -0.003*** 
 Overtime -0.009**   0.004 -0.001*** 0.011**   0.006   0.000 
 Commute 0.006 0.007   0.000 0.019**   0.009   0.001 
 Care -0.008 0.005   -0.0004* -0.005*   0.003   -0.0003** 
 Housework 0.006 0.005   0.0004* 0.007***   0.003   0.0004*** 
 Annual Income (£,000s) -0.031*** 0.003   -0.002*** -0.061***   0.007   -0.003*** 
 Married -0.217***  0.064   -0.013*** -0.699***   0.061   -0.042*** 
 No. Children 0.113***  0.029   0.006*** -0.244***   0.035   -0.013*** 
 Qualifications: References is No Qualifications 
 Degree -0.054  0.101   -0.002 -0.191   0.125   -0.008 
 ‘A’ Levels -0.161*  0.073   -0.008** -0.292***   0.080   -0.018*** 
 GCSE -0.089 0.069   -0.003 -0.046   0.069   -0.004 
 Major Occupation Group (SOC): Reference is elementary occupations 
 Managers -0.643*** 0.116   -0.033*** -0.407***   0.137   -0.022*** 
 Professionals 0.019  0.129   -0.005 -0.073   0.206   -0.008 
 Associate prof. and technical -0.066  0.108   -0.009* -0.144   0.133   -0.011* 
 Administrative -0.059   0.094   -0.005 -0.151*   0.086   -0.011** 
 Skilled trades -0.027 0.086   -0.005 -0.548***   0.204   -0.024*** 
 Personal service 0.254**  0.100   0.012* 0.029   0.083   -0.000 
 Sales and customer service -0.148 0.098   -0.013*** -0.050   0.078   -0.005 
 Plant, process, machine ops. -0.005 0.090 -0.003 -0.215   0.138   -0.013** 
 Macroeconomic Variables       
 Unemployment rate 0.040 0.032   0.003** 0.075**   0.032   0.005*** 
 Working Time Regulations 0.135 0.124   0.009 -0.106   0.121   -0.006 
 Work Life Balance Campaign -0.059  0.074   -0.003 0.057   0.078   0.005 
 Labour Government -0.072 0.132   -0.002 0.151   0.127   0.010* 
2 Prefer fewer hours       
 Constant -4.712***   0.229   — -4.51***   0.264   — 
 Microeconomic Variables       
 Age 0.111***   0.008   0.024*** 0.072***   0.009   0.012*** 
 Age2/100 -0.111***   0.009   -0.023*** -0.070***   0.011   -0.011*** 
 Working hours 0.045***   0.002   0.010*** 0.066***   0.002   0.013*** 
 Overtime 0.040***   0.002   0.009*** 0.035***   0.003   0.007*** 
 Commute 0.013***   0.003   0.003*** 0.025***   0.005   0.005*** 
 Care 0.002   0.002   -0.002* 0.004**   0.002   -0.001*** 
 Housework -0.007**   0.003   0.001** -0.002   0.002   0.001 
 Annual Income (£,000s) 0.004***   0.001   0.001*** 0.013***   0.002   0.003*** 
 Married 0.100***   0.032   0.026*** 0.313***   0.035   0.070*** 
 No. Children -0.038**   0.015   -0.010*** 0.039*   0.021   0.011*** 
 Qualifications: References is No Qualifications 
 Degree -0.055   0.052   -0.011 -0.093   0.068   -0.015 
 ‘A’ Levels 0.013   0.040   0.006 0.114**   0.050   0.026*** 
 GCSE -0.066*   0.038   -0.013 0.117***   0.044   0.023*** 
 Major Occupation Group (SOC): Reference is elementary occupations 
 Managers 0.489***   0.061   0.122*** 0.314***   0.078   0.069*** 
 Professionals 0.317***   0.073   0.072*** 0.271**   0.105   0.056** 
 Associate prof. and technical 0.319***   0.068   0.074*** 0.295***   0.084   0.062*** 
 Administrative 0.125*   0.068   0.029* 0.224***   0.070   0.046*** 
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 Skilled trades 0.221***   0.059   0.050*** 0.134   0.102   0.033 
 Personal Service 0.073   0.084   0.011 0.125   0.078   0.024 
 Sales and customer service 0.364***   0.075   0.087*** 0.197***   0.074   0.040*** 
 Plant, process, machine ops. 0.159***   0.060   0.036*** 0.193**   0.087   0.041** 
 Macroeconomic Variables       
 Unemployment rate -0.065***   0.018   -0.015*** -0.069***   0.021   -0.014*** 
 Working Time Regulations -0.134**   0.069   -0.032** 0.030   0.081   0.007 
 Work Life Balance Campaign 0.007   0.043   0.003 -0.146***   0.049   -0.029*** 
 Labour Government -0.102   0.073   -0.021 -0.207**   0.086   -0.043** 
 Model Diagnostics       
 Log likelihood -26650.527   -20838.511   
 Pseudo R-squared 0.085   0.123   
 Total observations 33,394   27,453   
Notes: Data from British Household Panel Survey, 1993-2009 for private sector employees; dependent variable 
based on responses to the question: ‘Thinking about the hours you work, assuming that you would be paid the 
same amount per hour, would you prefer to work fewer hours than you do now?’ 
Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Endnotes 
1 The authors would like to thank Geoff Harcourt, James Juniper, and two referees from this 
journal for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are our own. 
2 The right to request flexible working was established by the Employment Act, 2002 which 
amended the Employment Rights Act 1996 to establish a statutory right to request a contract 
variation relating to hours, timing of work or location of work for those with childcare 
responsibilities. The operational details of how requests should  be submitted and rights of 
redress should the process be seen to be breached by an employer were set down in Statutory 
Instruments – The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations SI 2002/3207 
and The Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations SI 2002/3236 
respectively. The latter were themselves amended with effect from 2007 to permit carers of 
adults to apply for flexible work arrangements on the same terms by The Flexible Working 
(Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) (Amendent) Regulations SI 2006/3314. See Deakin 
and Morris (2012, pp.750-2). 
3 The 1998 White Paper Fairness at Work set-out proposals by the first New Labour 
government for framework of individual, collective and family-friendly rights that would 
‘help to ensure the fair treatment of employees within a flexible and efficient labour market’ 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1998, para 1.14). Indeed, in the foreword Prime Minister 
Tony Blair noted that, ‘Even after the changes we propose, Britain will have the most lightly 
regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world…These proposals…put a very 
minimum infrastructure of decency and fairness around people in the workplace’ (ibid.,p.2). 
In the context of protections around working time the proposals for new regulations 
exemplified this approach being less the introduction of new absolute individual rights and 
more the creation of a framework that allowed for as much scope as possible to limit the 
application of restrictions: ‘The regulations are designed to allow maximum flexibility 
through agreements between employers, employees and trade unions’ (ibid., para 5.9).4 
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Elsewhere Foley refers to surplus-value being realised as wages for ‘unproductive workers in 
business and government’ (1986, p.123). However, in his numerical example, which we 
follow, he removes (unproductive) government employees a priori. In our approach we focus 
on the pre-tax earnings of firms, households and workers, and we are not persuaded to include 
the wages of public sector workers who provide health, education and social services in the 
numerator of the surplus-value, or exploitation, rate. 
5 Brown and Mohun treat mixed income as sui generis, i.e. neither compensation of 
employees or profits (2011, p.1040). Cuestas and Philp do likewise (2012). 
